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Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general,
the former allows the introduction of elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system
in its phase space. Often, these processes are strongly related, since an innovation can trigger the evolution, and
the latter can provide the optimal conditions for the emergence of innovations. Both processes can be studied by
using the framework of evolutionary game theory, where evolution constitutes an intrinsic mechanism. At the
same time, the concept of innovation requires an opportune mathematical representation. Notably, innovation can
be modeled as a strategy, or it can constitute the underlying mechanism that allows agents to change strategy. Here,
we analyze the second case, investigating the behavior of a heterogeneous population, composed of imitative and
innovative agents. Imitative agents change strategy only by imitating that of their neighbors, whereas innovative
ones change strategy without the need for a copying source. The proposed model is analyzed by means of
analytical calculations and numerical simulations in different topologies. Remarkably, results indicate that the
mixing of mechanisms can be detrimental to cooperation near phase transitions. In those regions, the spatial
reciprocity from imitative mechanisms is destroyed by innovative agents, leading to the downfall of cooperation.
Our investigation sheds some light on the complex dynamics emerging from the heterogeneity of strategy revision
methods, highlighting the role of innovation in evolutionary games.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.97.042305
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of cooperation is a topic of paramount
relevance in different areas, as demonstrated by the long list
of contributions across various fields, ranging from biology to
sociology, and from economics to robotics [1–4]. In a broad
sense, why should people cooperate with their peers in a
competitive scenario, where selfish individuals would often
fare better? Evolutionary game theory (EGT) constitutes one of
the most suitable tools for approaching such a question [5–7],
and the Prisoner’s dilemma represents the canonical way to
study how a cooperative behavior can emerge in a competitive
scenario [3,8]. The dynamics of evolutionary games shows how
cooperation results from a collective behavior. Notably, these
models consider a population that, under particular conditions,
is able to reach an equilibrium of cooperation even when the
agent interactions are based on games whose Nash equilibrium
is defection.
One of the earliest approaches in EGT, proposed by
Maynard Smith [5,9], uses the mathematical framework of
birth-death dynamics usually seen in biological evolution,
in a model in which individuals copy the strategy of more
successful contacts (akin to a Moran process). Using a linear
copy probability, this mechanism leads to the classical repli-
cator equation [10], i.e., the general mathematical model for
natural evolution. However, from a game theory perspective,
individuals can change strategy by many other mechanisms,
e.g., imitation of the best, win-stay-lose-learn, tit-for-tat, and so
on and so forth [3,10]. Here, updating rules based on imitative
mechanisms can be defined as noninnovative [10], since they
allow individuals to choose only among strategies adopted in
their neighborhood. As a result, once a strategy disappears, it
can be considered as extinct if there is no external mutation
mechanism. It is important to note how mutation mechanisms
can lead to diversity, but they are not directly related to
an innovative updating rule, which represents the ability of
one individual to choose a strategy that does not appear in
its neighborhood. On the other hand, mechanisms that lead
individuals to change strategy without the need to copy from
a source (e.g., a neighbor) can be defined as innovative. For
instance, one individual might change strategy by analyzing
the trend of her or his gain, e.g., a decreasing gain might lead to
testing a different strategy. One of the most famous cases is the
win-stay-lose-shift, where if the individual has a payoff below
some aspiration level, she or he simply changes strategy, no
matter which strategies are available from the neighborhood.
Two other famous examples of innovative updating rules are
the Logit rule and best response [11–14].
From the point of view of information theory, there is an
important difference between these two classes of updating
rules, i.e., innovative and noninnovative. Notably, rational
individuals [15] select their strategy according to rules that
take into account their gain over time, or their current gain and
that of their neighbors. Therefore, they need some information
in order to make a decision. Thus, the essential difference
between innovative and noninnovative individuals lays in the
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information source they adopt or have about the system. As
reported in previous investigations (e.g., [12,14,16–18]), the
application of innovative and noninnovative updating rules
leads to results that can be drastically different. As a very inter-
esting and recent example, Ref. [19] showed how innovative
strategies toward vaccination can lead to different dynamics
from the usual imitative ones, changing the vaccination cov-
erage. It is interesting to observe that imitative mechanisms
are usually associated with long-term biological evolution.
The copying process is related to the offspring of a more
successful individual inheriting her or his parent strategy. On
the other hand, innovative dynamics can model the behavior of
individuals that, like humans, have cognitive responses to the
environment [20,21], and that happen on shorter time scales.
Imitative dynamics have been broadly studied for different
games, updating rules and connection topologies. Some classic
mechanisms that support cooperation in this setting include kin
selection [22], mobility and dilution [23], direct and indirect
reciprocity [24], network reciprocity [25,26], group selection
[27], dissociation [28], and population heterogeneity [29–31]
(for reviews, see [10,32,33]). Nevertheless, innovative mech-
anisms still require deeper studies in the evolutionary context.
It is worth highlighting the strong relation between innovation
and cooperation, as reported in recent works demonstrating
that, if a population adopts just an innovative strategy for
performing updates, cooperation can be sustained for a large
range of parameters. In [16], the authors show that win-stay-
lose-shift with dynamic aspiration can lead to the coexistence
of cooperation and defection for the whole parameter range,
while, at the same time, cooperators do not need to form
islands to survive. In [12,34,35], a model based on the Glauber
dynamics (from magnetism) shows the survival of cooperators
while leading the population to global stable patterns, in a
process akin to the minimization of energy. Driven by this
observation, in this work we propose an evolutionary model
for studying the dynamics of a heterogeneous population
composed of imitative and innovative agents. In particular,
imitative agents adopt the typical copying mechanism with
a probability weighted by the Fermi-Dirac distribution, while
the innovative ones use the Logit rule (also weighted by the
Fermi-Dirac distribution).
Heterogeneity, in the most general form, is a strong facil-
itator of cooperation. The mixing of strategies, e.g., different
kinds of players, topologies, etc., has been shown time and
again to be a great promoter of cooperation [30,31,36–45]. In
this sense, we mix two kinds of agents, each one following a
specific updating rule. In doing so, we can analyze the results
coming from a form of heterogeneity related to the “updating
rules.”
We first solve the mean-field equation for the model in the
well-mixed case and perform Monte Carlo simulations in a
square lattice to observe the effects of the spatial structure.
Most intriguingly, we find that while a pure innovative pop-
ulation can maintain a high level of cooperation, a minimum
cooperation level occurs in the mixed state of innovators and
imitators. This happens for the Prisoner’s dilemma near a
critical point that characterizes the phase transition of the pure
imitative model. To verify the robustness of this result, we also
analyze other connection topologies and games such as the
Stag Hunt and Snow Drift. Lastly, we study what mechanisms
create this drop in cooperation for the mixed states using lattice
snapshots and the individual fraction of each population (i.e.,
innovative cooperators, innovative defectors, etc.).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II introduces the proposed model and its dynamics.
Section III reports results of analytical calculations and nu-
merical simulations. Finally, Sec. IV provides a summary of
the main outcomes and related observations.
II. MODEL
In the proposed model, we aim to clarify the influence
of innovation in the dynamics of evolutionary games by
considering the behavior of a population whose agents have
two strategies available, namely cooperation (C) and defection
(D). Such a scenario can be represented by the following payoff
matrix:
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
, (1)
where two cooperative agents receive a reward (R), two de-
fectors receive a punishment (P ), and an agent that cooperates
with a defector receives S, while the defecting agent receives a
temptation (T ). Using the parametrization R = 1,P = 0,S =
[−1,1],T = [0,2], we can explore the dynamics of the model
in four different configurations, i.e., the Prisoner’s Dilemma
for (T > 1,S < 0), the Stag-Hunt for (T < 1,S < 0), the
Snow-Drift for (T > 1,S > 0), and the Harmony Game for
(T < 1,S > 0) [10,46].
In addition, our agents are provided with a character, i.e.,
they can be innovators or imitators. Notably, a fixed fraction of
agents, sayα, will update its strategy according to a mechanism
based on innovation, whereas a fraction (1 − α) of agents will
change its strategy by adopting the typical imitative dynamic
[8,10]. We emphasize that while agents can change strategy
(e.g., from C to D) over time, their character (imitative or
innovative) never changes. As result, an imitative agent i, at
each update, randomly chooses one neighbor j and copies its
strategy with probability:
p(uij )imt = 11 + e−(uj−ui )/k , (2)
where ui and uj indicate the payoff of the selected agent (i) and
of its neighbor (j ), respectively, while k represents the agent’s
irrationality. Here we set k = 0.1, i.e., a numerical value that
is widely used in the literature in order to add small noise in
the decision process. As reported above, the imitation rule is
a noninnovative mechanism [10] because an agent changes
strategy by considering only among those available in its
neighborhood. In doing so, new strategies can never appear
once extinguished, and, most importantly, agents can never
“explore” new ones [10,14]. Notably, the process of imitation
is similar to local competition where death is a random uniform
process, and reproduction rates are determined by the payoff
(fitness).
On the other hand, an innovative agent, i, changes its current
strategy to the opposite one with probability:
p(ui)inv = 11 + e−(ui∗−ui )/k , (3)
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where ui∗ is the agent’s own payoff if it had changed to the
opposite strategy and everything else remained the same. It is
worth remembering that this updating rule corresponds to the
Glauber dynamics in magnetic models [47,48], while in the
context of Game Theory it is known as Logit dynamics, myopic
best response, or the myopic Logit rule [11,14,35]. According
to this rule, an innovative agent evaluates the gain that it might
achieve by changing strategy, under the hypothesis that its
neighborhood remains unchanged. As reported in previous
investigations [12–14,16,49], this mechanism leads to very
different results compared to imitative dynamics. Tuning the
value of α between 0 (i.e., full imitation) and 1 (i.e., full
innovation), we aim to analyze how innovation affects the
dynamics toward cooperation in different conditions.
III. RESULTS
The proposed model is studied by means of numerical
simulations, by arranging agents over a regular lattice, and
on complex networks. However, as a preliminary study, we
perform analytical calculations considering the dynamics of a
well-mixed population using the mean-field approximation.
A. Well-mixed population
We begin the analysis of the proposed model with the case of
a well-mixed population. Notably, by using the master equation
in the mean-field approach [10,50,51], the temporal evolution
of the cooperator’s density, ρ, reads
ρ˙ = (1 − ρ)+ − ρ−, (4)
where + stands for the average rate at which agents change
strategy from D to C, leading to an increase in ρ (and similarly
to −). While usually this rate depends on just one updating
rule, in our case we need to consider the presence of two
kinds of agents, i.e., innovators and imitators. As result, both
rates, ±, will be the average rate between each updating rule,
weighted by α:
± = (1 − α)±imt + α±inv. (5)
Notably, for the well-mixed population we have the follow-
ing rates [10,12]:
+imt = ρ1 + e−A/k , (6)
−imt = 1 − ρ1 + e+A/k , (7)
±inv = 11 + e∓A/k , (8)
where A = ρ(1 − T ) + (1 − ρ)S is the difference in the aver-
age payoff from a typical C and D agent interacting with all
other agents. Note that for the innovative updating rate, ±inv,
the only change between the positive (+inv) and negative
(−inv) rate is in the sign of A. Accordingly, the full equation
becomes
ρ˙ = (1 − ρ)
[
ρ(1 − α) + α
1 + e−A/k
]
− ρ
[ (1 − ρ)(1 − α) + α
1 + eA/k
]
.
(9)
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FIG. 1. Asymptotic cooperation fraction (ρ) vs temptation to
defect (T ) in the weak Prisoner’s dilemma (S = 0) in the mean-field,
well-mixed population for the innovative (α = 1) and imitative (α =
0) model, compared with the mixed population of half innovative and
half imitative agents (α = 0.5).
We solve Eq. (9) numerically, letting the system reach the equi-
librium point as t → ∞. This gives the asymptotic behavior
of the population for the well-mixed case—see Fig. 1 for the
fully imitative (α = 0), fully innovative (α = 1), and mixed
(α = 0.5) cases.
This preliminary analysis shows that the behavior of the
heterogeneous population is not just the average value of the
two pure cases (α = 0 or 1), i.e., even if half the population
is imitative, the behavior is much more similar to the pure
innovative population. Also, we observe in Fig. 1 that the
point T = 1 is relevant, as it defines which updating rule leads
to the highest value of cooperation. If T < 1, the imitative
population has a higher cooperation fraction, while for T > 1,
the innovative population has higher levels of cooperation.
Specifically, if T = 1 and S = 0, we obtain that A = 0 in
Eq. (9), leading to ρ˙ = α(1 − 2ρ). This ODE has only one
fixed point at ρ = 0.5, which is independent of α, as we see in
Fig. 1; all three models have the same value of ρ for T = 1.
We proceed by analyzing how different values of α affect
the population. In particular, as shown in Fig. 2, cooperation
increases monotonously with α in the region T > 1, while the
opposite occurs for T < 1. In this case, innovation is beneficial
to cooperation only for the Prisoner’s Dilemma region of the
parameter T . If T < 1, which characterizes the region of Stag-
Hunt and Harmony-Game, cooperation fares better if there are
more imitative agents, i.e., low α values.
B. Structured population
To study the behavior of the proposed model considering
a structured population, we initially perform Monte Carlo
simulations by arranging 104 agents in a square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions. Here, at each time step, an agent
(say i) interacts with its neighbors and, according to the payoff
matrix of the game, obtains a cumulative payoff. Then, agent i
undergoes the “strategy revision phase” (SRP) that is based on
the probability defined in Eq. (2), or in Eq. (3), depending on
its nature, i.e., imitator or innovator. Thus, the described set of
actions (i.e., from the agent selection to the SRP) is repeated N
times (where N is the total number of agents), which constitute
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FIG. 2. Asymptotic cooperation level, ρ, vs fraction of innova-
tors, α, here S = 0. Results obtained from the mean-field equation in
the well-mixed population. The increasing of innovators is beneficial
for cooperation in the weak Prisoner’s Dilemma (T > 1), while
detrimental to it in the region T < 1. In T = 1 all models have the
same asymptotic behavior.
a single Monte Carlo step (MCS). The simulation lasts until
the population reaches a stable state (103–104 MCS’s) [10].
After that, results are averaged over the last 1000 MCS and
observed for 10–50 different initial conditions. It is worth
reporting that, at the beginning of each simulation, we start with
a homogeneous strategy distribution, so that half the population
is composed of cooperators, and half of defectors.
Figure 3, based on the weak Prisoner’s Dilemma (S = 0),
shows the ρ-T graph for the following cases: fully imitative
(α = 0), fully innovative (α = 1), and equally mixed popula-
tion (α = 0.5). The behavior in the structured population is
different from the well-mixed case, especially for T > 0.9.
It is worth noting that, in the square lattice, even if the
behavior of the mixed population stays, usually, between the
two pure cases (i.e., α = 0 and 1), some values of T can
lead to different scenarios. In particular, in the range 0.8 <
T < 1.03, detailed in the inset of Fig. 3, the heterogeneous
population exhibits the lowest cooperation value among the
three presented models. Surprisingly, we find that in this region,
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
T
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 ρ
α=0
α=0.5
α=1
0.85 0.9 0.95 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FIG. 3. Asymptotic cooperation level (ρ) vs temptation to defect
(T ) in a square lattice for the weak Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each line
corresponds to a different fraction of innovators (α). The inset shows
the T region where the heterogeneous population, α = 0.5, has a
cooperation level lower than any pure population.
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FIG. 4. Asymptotic cooperation level, ρ, for an increasing frac-
tion of innovators (α) in the square lattice. The behavior is quite
different from the well-mixed population. In the region T > 1.04,
it is always better to have a fully innovative population. But for
0.8 < T < 1.04, there is always a minimum value of ρ for mixed
populations.
cooperation is higher when the population is composed of
only one kind of agent (i.e., full imitation or full innovation).
In addition, we note that the considered range of T contains
the critical point of the phase transition from cooperation to
defection in the full imitative model [10], suggesting that a
heterogeneous population undergoes a faster transition than a
homogeneous one.
Figure 4 shows how the final cooperation level varies, as we
increase the number of innovative agents for a given T value
(S = 0). There are regions where the dependence with α is not
trivial, especially around T = 1 (i.e., near the edge between the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt game). Notably, in this
region, the mixing of different updating rules tends to reduce
cooperation. This effect is especially strong near T = 1.04,
where the imitative model shows a phase transition [10]. We
note that this drop in cooperation for mixed updating rules was
also observed in [18], which considers a very different setting,
the Public Goods Game with a different kind of innovative SRP
(win-stay-lose-shift), mixed with the imitation model. Also,
[35] showed that mixed strategies coupled with coevolutionary
processes can lead to spontaneous cyclic dominance and
diverse complex patterns in the population.
To further back our claims, we analyze the same setting
in a triangular lattice with periodic boundary conditions. We
see in Fig. 5(a) the same qualitative behavior observed in the
square lattice, i.e., there is a drop in cooperation level near the
phase-transition point of the system when we mix updating
rules. We see that for 0.95 < T < 1.25, the mixing of strategies
only decreases cooperation. The effect disappears after T >
1.25, when cooperation is already extinct for the fully imitative
population. Figure 5(b) shows the behavior as we increase α.
As in the square lattice, ρ reaches a minimum for small α
values near the range of T where the imitative model has a
drop in cooperation.
We also ran simulations of similar settings in a random and a
scale-free network with an average connectivity degree of 2.7,
generated using the Krapivsky-Redner algorithm [52]. Note
that the scale-free network is a very famous case of spatial
reciprocity when the imitation rule is used [10], and at the
042305-4
HETEROGENEOUS UPDATE MECHANISMS IN … PHYSICAL REVIEW E 97, 042305 (2018)
0.9 1 1.1 1.2
 T
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 ρ
 α=0
 α=0.5
 α=1
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
 α
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 ρ
T=0.95
T=1
T=1.1
T=1.3
(b)
FIG. 5. Asymptotic cooperation level (ρ) in a triangular lattice. In
(a) we show the dependence in T , while in (b) we show its dependence
in α. As we can see, the mixing of update rules can lead to a drop
in cooperation for 0.95 < T < 1.25. The behavior is qualitatively
similar to the square lattice.
same time it is known that the pure innovative rule destroys this
reciprocity effect [16]. The results are shown in Fig. 6(a) for the
random network and Fig. 6(b) for the scale-free network. The
same qualitative effect was observe in these two topologies. As
we approach a value of T where cooperation drops for the pure
imitative or innovative model, here T = 1, cooperation from
the mixed model drops below the value of any pure model.
It is interesting to note the same effect in all these different
topologies, as it points to a general behavior.
Next we present the asymptotic levels of cooperation in the
full T -S parameter space for the square lattice. The imitative
model (i.e., α = 0) is presented in Fig. 7(a), the heterogeneous
population (i.e., α = 0.5) in Fig. 7(b), and the fully innovative
population (i.e., α = 1) in Fig. 7(c). In this parametrization
(R = 1, S = 0), each quadrant of the parameter space corre-
sponds to one specific game: Harmony Game (HG), Snow-
Drift (SD), Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), and Stag-Hunt (SH), in
a clockwise fashion. Note that the pure cases differ mainly in
the SH and SD regions, and the heterogeneous population leads
to a behavior that is, usually, in between the two pure cases.
With the aim to compare the mixed and pure cases in
the square lattice, Fig. 8 shows the difference in the final
cooperation fraction between the heterogeneous model (ρmix),
and the average value of the pure imitative (ρimt) and pure
innovative (ρinv) models, i.e.,
ρ = ρmix − [(1 − α)ρimt + αρinv]. (10)
This is particularly useful for observing whether there is any
nonlinear phenomenon. If innovative and imitative agents did
not influence one another, it would be expected that ρ = 0,
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
 T
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 ρ
 α=0
 α=0.5
 α=1
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 ρ
α=0
α=0.5 
α=1
(b)
FIG. 6. Asymptotic cooperation level (ρ) as we increase T for a
random network in (a) and a scale-free network in (b). The drop in
cooperation for the mixed population, compared to pure populations,
happens in both topologies.
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FIG. 7. Asymptotic cooperation level (colors) in the whole T -S
parameter space for the square lattice. We have (a) the pure imitation
model (α = 0), (b) the mixture of imitation and Logit dynamics (α =
0.5), and (c) the pure Logit (α = 1) model. The main differences
happen in the SH and SD regions.
as the mixing of the two would behave as just the average
of the two pure models. Here we use α = 0.2, as this is the
region where the mixed model differs most from the pure
models. Note that the mixed model is mainly different from
the average in the diagonal (S = T − 1), with specific regions
where the mixing can increase the cooperation in even 0.2,
or lower it in −0.8 for the SH region. On the other hand,
there are smaller positive and negative differences through all
the SD region. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Harmony Game
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FIG. 8. Difference in asymptotic cooperation level (colors) be-
tween the mixed model (α = 0.2) and the average between the Logit
and imitation model. The mixed model behaves differently from just
the average of the two models, mainly in the SD and SH regions.
regions are almost unchanged, except near the lineS = 0 (weak
Prisoner’s Dilemma).
To understand how the mixing can be detrimental to coop-
eration, we study the subpopulation of innovative cooperators
(Cinv) and imitative cooperators (Cimt) separately. Figure 9
reports the four subpopulations (including innovative and
imitative defectors) for the mixed case, α = 0.5. Note that
imitative cooperators follow the usual behavior expected for
a fully imitative population, i.e., they are almost extinguished
for T > 1.04, while innovative cooperators survive. But un-
expectedly, while there are some innovative defectors, it is
the imitative defectors that fare better for higher T values.
This result strongly suggests that the imitative behavior favors
cooperation for T < 1 and defection for T > 1, while the
innovative behavior has a smaller effect in this regard. We stress
that such behavior is consistent for all values of α.
In the same spirit, we present in Fig. 10 the four subpopula-
tions as we continuously vary α for three different values of T .
In Fig. 10(a), we have low temptation, T = 0.8, where there is
0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2
T
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 ρ Cinv
Cimt
Dinv
Dimt
FIG. 9. Asymptotic cooperation and defector fraction for the two
types of agents, innovative and imitative, in the square lattice. Here
S = 0 and α = 0.5. While innovative cooperators (Cinv) can survive
for high T , conversely it is the imitative defectors (Dimt) that fare
better when T > 1. A similar behavior occurs for all α values.
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(a)
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FIG. 10. Asymptotic fraction of the four types of agents (imitative
and innovative cooperators and defectors) as α is increased for (a)
T = 0.8, (b) T = 1, and (c) T = 1.05. The behavior is linear with α
in (a) and (b). However, For T = 1 there is a nonlinear behavior, with
an increase of Dimt until α = 0.2.
no defection and Cinv grows, while Cimt drops linearly with α.
In Fig. 10(c), the temptation value is high (i.e., T = 1.05) and
then the same linear behavior occurs for defectors (although
now there are some innovative cooperators that can survive
for high T ). The most interesting effect nevertheless occurs
for intermediate values of T . Figure 10(b) shows results for
T = 1, where a nonlinear behavior emerges for imitative
agents. We see that, as expected, the increasing in α (i.e.,
the total fraction of innovative agents) is detrimental to im-
itative cooperators. However, remarkably, imitative defectors
take profit from that, growing to a peak at α = 0.2. The mixing
of updating rules favors defection for this range of α values
(specifically imitative defectors). It is worthwhile to emphasize
that the described phenomenon is not intuitive. The increasing
in innovative agents makes the subpopulation of imitative
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FIG. 11. Ratio between the normalized fraction of innovative and
imitative agents in the square lattice for three different values of α.
The ratio of cooperators is shown in black, and defectors are in red.
Notice that φC grows with T , while φD is always smaller than 1.
defectors sharply grow until 20% of the lattice is composed
of innovative agents.
Figure 11 reports the ratio between innovative and imitative
agents of each strategy (φC andφD)in the region nearT = 1. To
compare different fractions of innovative agents for different
levels of α, we normalize each population, dividing the fraction
of innovative cooperators by α, and the fraction of imitative
cooperators by 1 − α (and doing the same for defectors). This
is done to prevent the oversampling of innovative agents in a
scenario with high α values, i.e.,
φC = Cinv
α
1 − α
Cimt
. (11)
In doing so, we can see that there is a general behavior in
each population that is independent of α. For T < 1, the ratio
φC is close to 1, as cooperators from both types dominate
the population. Although the total number of cooperators
decreases as we increase T , the ratio between innovative
and imitative cooperators keeps increasing, indicating that
innovative ones have the advantage. At the same time, φD
varies for 1 < T < 1.04 but is always below 1 for the whole T
range. In other words, imitative sites will tend to be defectors,
regardless of the total number of defectors. This general
behavior occurs for any value of α.
Lastly, we analyze the snapshots of the square lattice to
better understand this phenomenon on a microscopic level.
Note that the Monte Carlo method is probabilistic, and accurate
results are dependent on sufficiently large averages [53,54].
Nevertheless, looking at frames of the lattice, after the system
has reached dynamical stability, can lead us to valuable
insights. Those snapshots are shown in Fig. 12. We remind
the reader that the pure imitative model has a phase transition
in T = 1.04 [10], and near this region cooperation is mainly
sustained because cooperators tend to form compact clusters to
support each other [25]. This behavior can be seen in Fig. 12(a),
where α = 0.1 and most of the population is imitative. At
the same time, the pure innovative Logit model has a higher
fraction of cooperators for T = 1.04. However, in this case,
cooperators do not form compact clusters. Instead, they spread
out in the lattice and cooperation is sustained because of other
mechanisms related to second-order spatial effects, as seen in
(a) (b)
FIG. 12. Snapshots of the square lattice with T = 1 for (a) α =
0.1 and (b) α = 0.7. As we mix innovators, the imitative cooperator
islands get dissolved, leading to a drop in total cooperation. Cooper-
ators are shown in blue and defectors in red.
[12,16]. Mixing both models, innovative cooperators spread
through the lattice, and, in turn, imitative cooperators are not
able to form clusters to protect themselves. At the same time,
imitative defectors manage to invade cooperators from both
subpopulations, leading to the downfall of cooperation. This
can be seen in Fig. 12. As we increase α, the clusters tend
to dissolve. The process of dissolving the cooperator islands
is gradual and continuous in α. This is highly dependent on
the parameters, and just a small fraction of innovators can
destroy the clusters when T is near the phase transition point.
The mixing of both updating rules near the critical point man-
ages to neutralize the mechanism for maintaining cooperation
from both imitative and innovative models. This is a robust
mechanism, happening in the square and triangular lattice, as
well as in random and scale-free networks. Nevertheless, it is
important to keep in mind that this phenomenon happens for a
specific range of parameters in the T -S plane, near the phase
transition of the pure imitative model.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of
heterogeneous populations, whose interactions are based on
dilemma games. In particular, our populations are composed of
two kinds of agents, i.e., innovators and imitators. In principle,
the main difference between them is related to the information
source they use to modify their strategy, e.g., from cooperation
to defection (or vice versa). Notably, innovators can estimate
the potential gain they would receive when changing strategy,
under the hypothesis that those of their neighbors remain
constant. On the other hand, imitators make decisions by
copying one randomly selected neighbor, depending on their
payoff difference. As a result, innovators are able to adopt
even strategies that do not exist in their neighborhood, while
imitators cannot do the same.
Innovation is an issue of paramount relevance in a number
of systems, spanning from social to biological phenomena.
Thus, it is expected to have an impact also in evolutionary
games. To shed further light on this aspect, the proposed model
aims to analyze the influence of innovation by considering the
updating mechanisms, i.e., the processes that allow agents to
change strategy. To this end, we first studied the dynamics of
a population in the mean-field case, so that we were able to
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solve the model analytically. Then, we performed numerical
simulations considering agents arranged on a regular square
and triangular lattice, as well as in random and scale-free
networks.
The well-mixed case has a transition at T = 1, where
ρ = 0.5, for any fraction of innovators. We found that, if
T < 1, imitation supports cooperation while, if T > 1, in-
novation supports cooperation. This behavior was shown to
be monotonous with the fraction of innovators only for the
well-mixed case. The structured case usually shows a behavior
in between the pure kinds (full imitation and full innovation),
although it is not a linear relation, i.e., 〈ρimt + ρinv〉 = ρmix.
On the other hand, remarkably, we found that cooperation has
a nontrivial behavior for the heterogeneous population near
phase transition points. For the square lattice, in the region
0.8 < T < 1.04 there is always a minimum level of cooper-
ation for any population mixing (0 < α < 1). The triangular
lattice, random, and scale-free networks also show a similar
behavior, i.e., cooperation drops near the phase transition
point of each topology when we mix strategy updating rules.
Specifically, near the transition from cooperation to defection,
homogeneous populations perform better than heterogeneous
ones in supporting cooperation. We also note that this kind
of behavior has been reported in investigations based on a
different scenario (i.e., using the Public Goods Games, mixing
imitative and win-stay-lose-shift updates).
We obtained compelling evidence that suggests this behav-
ior is due to the interaction of innovative and imitative agents in
heterogeneous populations. In addition, lattice snapshots and
the ratio of innovative to imitative agents indicate that near
T = 1, innovative cooperators destroy the spatial reciprocity,
while at the same time imitative defectors can invade both
populations of cooperators. The mixing of two updating rules
can destroy both mechanisms that sustain cooperation in each
of the two pure cases.
The results of our investigations confirm that innovation
plays a nontrivial role in evolutionary games. Diversity and
heterogeneity usually increase cooperation due to assortative
effects. However, we have seen that this may not always be the
case, as in some particular conditions mixed strategy revision
rules can lead to lower cooperation.
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